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How does the experience of hearing someone 
speaking differ from the experience of either 
imagining or remembering it? 
Real Hallucinations. Psychiatric Illness, 
Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World is 
Matthew Ratcliffe’s attempt to answer this 
question. In fact, the analysis of auditory verbal 
hallucinations (AVH) and thought insertions (TI) 
allows him to pursue a twofold broader aim: to 
provide an account of the modal structure of 
intentionality, and to explain how this structure – 
and consequently the features of both experience 
and thought – is shaped by subjects’ interpersonal 
relations. In doing so, Ratcliffe brilliantly links 
phenomenological analysis and empirical studies 
to debates from various philosophical traditions. 
One of the most significant merits of Real 
Hallucinations is that it overturns the traditional 
philosophical approach to hallucinations. Indeed, 
philosophers have mainly conceived of hal-
lucinations in terms of “possible” – rather than 
“actual” – experiences, that are indistinguishable 
from veridical perception while happening in the 
absence of the corresponding external object. 
Such a conception of hallucination has been 
central to several philosophical arguments, and 
yet Real Hallucinations indicates that the study of 
actual hallucinations is at least equally philo-
sophically relevant. In particular, Ratcliffe 
effectively shows that real hallucinations are not 
(or not necessarily) indistinguishable from their 
perceptual counterparts, and he argues that they 
should be rather understood as intrinsically odd 
experiences. The oddity of real hallucinations is 
due to special characteristics of such experiences, 
which Ratcliffe regards as  “mixed states”, where a 
content with aspects typical of a given intentional 
state would be paired with the sense of being in 
another kind of intentional state, and conflicting 
attitudes would be «simultaneously adopted in 
relation to the same content» (p. 62). To support 
such a claim, he focuses on specific occurrences of 
AVHs that seem to have little or no sensory 
content to the extent that they correspond to 
experiences of thought insertion. The content of 
such experiences «may continue to resemble that 
of a thought, but it somehow affects one in a way 
that is more like that of a perception. In other 
words, one has something of the sense of perceiving 
[…]» (p. 63). 
If Ratcliffe is correct, in order to account for 
the sense of being in a perceptual state, it is not 
enough to appeal to either the intentional content 
or the intentional attitude (or a combination of 
the two). Rather, «the prereflexive ability to 
discriminate between types of intentional state 
can be construed in terms of access to a modal 
space […]» (p. 20) that, in chapter 2, is argued to 
be central to the most basic sense of self, and to be 
both «developmentally dependent on inter-
actions with other people» and «interpersonally 
sustained» (p. 17). Drawing on Husserl’s idea 
that the perception of an object involves the 
appreciation of a «characteristic horizon of 
possibilities, a structured system of potentialities 
for ongoing perceptual access» (p. 123), Ratcliffe 
argues that «the sense of being in a given type of 
intentional state depends, to a significant extent, 
on the temporal structure of experience and, 
more specifically, on patterns of anticipation 
fulfillment» (p. 164). When we perceive an 
object, we experience it as being potentially 
accessible by others, through other sensory 
modalities, from different perspectives, and – 
Ratcliffe adds – as being possibly involved in both 
our and others’ goal-directed actions. These 
possibilities take the form of immediate 
anticipation, and they delineate the typical 
structure of perceptual experience as a dynamic 
process of anticipation and fulfillment: «as 
possibilities are actualized (through one’s own 
actions, the actions of others, and/or impersonal 
events), other possibilities are revealed, and so 
on» (p. 124). This structure corresponds to the 
phenomenological datum that in perception we 
experience things as “really there” – what Ratcliffe 
refers to in terms of a combination of “sense of 
presence” and “sense of reality”. The temporal 
profiles of intentional states other than perception 
are then to be understood as departures from this 
structure. Imagination, for instance, typically has a 
less cohesive and structured anticipation-
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fulfillment profile, and «the imagined entity does 
not call out for further exploration in the way a 
perceived entity does» (p. 164). 
Ratcliffe further shows that for us to grasp the 
various temporal profiles, the local anticipation-
fulfillment patterns have to be «embedded within 
an all-enveloping anticipatory structure that is not 
itself a form of intentionality» (p. 4). Indeed, 
although our anticipations are not always fulfilled, 
and neither are they always unambiguous, 
unfulfillment and ambiguity are experienced as 
anomalies, thus giving rise to disappointment and 
doubt. Drawing on Husserl’s notion of certainty 
and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “belonging to the 
world”, Ratcliffe’s claims that disappointment and 
doubt would not arise if the localized experiences 
and thoughts were not embedded within a “global 
anticipatory structure”, a temporal pattern that 
pervades all experience and makes it possible. In 
other words, «our grasp of what it is for something 
to be present or not present, and, more generally, 
for it to be the case or not the case, presupposes a 
habitual style of immersion in a situation» (p. 
130). Such a “global style of anticipation” – in 
Ratcliffe terms –, is associated with an affective 
element, namely “confidence”. 
In this context, AVHs arise, facilitated by a 
change in the global style of anticipation, as local 
disruptions of the modal structure of 
intentionality. At the local level, Ratcliffe stresses 
the triggering role played by anxiety. Expanding 
on the failure of the source monitoring account of 
AVHs, Ratcliffe argues that voices would be cases 
of inner speech that are anxiously anticipated. In 
particular, «an unpleasant emotional content p 
[…] provokes anxious anticipation of the 
linguistic content q, that is elicited by p and 
consistent with p» (p. 89). Because anxiety 
presents its object as unpleasant and unfamiliar, 
the thought that q is experienced as alien. Since 
anxious anticipation is a style of anticipation 
typical of «certain affectively charged perceptual 
experiences» (p. 89), the thought-content q is 
accompanied by a sense of being in a perceptual 
state. The broader context that makes such local 
disruptions possible, on the other hand, is what 
Jasper calls “delusional atmosphere”, and it is 
explained by Ratcliffe in terms of Husserlian 
certainty. Here, trauma plays a central role: while 
habitual anticipation has the affective style of 
confidence, severe trauma leads to loss of trust 
and, consequently, to pervasive doubt and all-
encompassing uncertainty, resulting in the 
disruption of the modal structure of 
intentionality. As a result, the anticipation-
fulfillment structure of perception would become 
closer to that of imagination, thus leaving one 
more exposed to the risk of localized disruptions. 
Ratcliffe stresses the role of interpersonal 
relationships, in this context, by arguing that 
trauma leads to disastrous consequences in 
particular when it is caused by other people. Since 
our perceptual experience is largely shaped by 
habitual trust in others, a change in the way one 
relates to others is particularly likely to lead to 
erosions of the modal structure of intentionality. 
Real Hallucinations has the essential value of 
stressing the need for a more complex taxonomy of 
experience, one that would provide, for all types of 
intentional states, «an inventory of characteristics 
that are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for the ambiguous, unambiguous, 
conflicted or nonconflicted sense of being in an 
intentional state of that kind» (p. 224). However, 
Ratcliffe seems also to suggest that subtle changes 
in the structure of intentionality cannot be 
captured – and are on the contrary ultimately 
obscured – by the «artificially tidy philosophical 
language that identifies categorical distinct 
intentional state types» (p. 225). Although this 
remark correctly identifies the dismissal of 
important phenomenological nuances typical of a 
certain way of doing philosophy, if taken to its 
extreme consequences it would imply the 
impossibility to categorize intentional states 
altogether. It is true, for instance, that for a long 
time philosophers have conceived of intentional 
states in idealized and abstract terms. Such an 
approach to intentionality might have led to 
oversimplifications, an instance of which is the 
trend to reduce hallucinations to one or another 
kind of typical intentional state, namely perception 
or – more recently – imagination. Real 
Hallucinations shows that, if we at least want our 
taxonomy to be informative of actual experiences, 
we shall consider single instances of intentionality 
as integrated within a broader system of 
experiences and thought. Precisely the view of 
intentional states as interrelated and at least 
partly dependent on the subject’s background 
experiences is, in my opinion, one the most 
interesting and original contribution of Real 
Hallucinations. While the dominant trend in 
philosophy of mind – on the heels of the 
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mainstream tendency in epistemology of 
regarding the subject as a perfect knower – is still 
that of investigating intentionality irrespective of 
the context in which an intentional state occurs, 
Ratcliffe puts the subject, its current and past 
experiences, and its interpersonal relations back 
at the center of the investigation. 
In so doing, however, Ratcliffe may run the 
risk of overlooking the methodological intricacy 
of such an undertaking. In the first place, a 
phenomenological investigation of real hal-
lucinations necessarily relies on verbal reports, 
which can be more or less reliable depending on 
different factors such as, for instance, the 
introspective – and linguistic – skills of a subject. 
Moreover, a purely phenomenological approach 
to intentionality is based on the disputable 
assumption that every aspect of a given 
experience is phenomenally accessible to the 
subject. In the introduction, Ratcliffe recognizes 
that «phenomenology alone does not always 
suffice to determine one’s actual intentional 
state» (p. 2) and anticipates this line of criticism 
stressing that Real Hallucinations is «phe-
nomenological in emphasis» (p. 2), and therefore 
non-phenomenal aspects are irrelevant to his 
argument. However, it cannot be simply ruled out 
that non-phenomenal aspects might influence the 
overall phenomenology of the experience in ways 
that are not accessible to the subject. For instance, 
if the goal is to understand what the sense of 
being in a given intentional state is and how it 
arises, and if it is admitted that it depends 
importantly on other mental states, phenomenally 
inaccessible aspects of past (or co-occurrent) 
experiences might significantly influence the 
phenomenology itself of the state under 
consideration. Furthermore, even granting that 
non-phenomenal aspects are irrelevant to the 
investigation of experience, a certain level of 
abstraction seems to be hardly avoidable. For 
instance, the description of conflicted states 
would require a clear-cut and therefore idealized 
definition of typical cases of standard intentional 
states (e.g., perception, memory, imagination) 
and of their features. In order to tell what aspects 
of what kinds of intentional state come together 
in conflicted and ambiguous experiences, we need 
to make categorical and somehow artificial 
distinctions not only among different kinds of 
intentional states, but also among the different 
aspects of a given experience and their unique 
contribution to the overall phenomenology. 
Similarly, it is unclear in what way we could 
investigate how and to what extent an experience is 
affected by other intentional states without 
artificially isolating it from past and future 
experiences, and from co-occurring intentional 
states. 
Certainly, however, a complete and satisfying 
taxonomy of experience goes way beyond the 
scope of Real Hallucinations, which has the 
undeniable merit of highlighting the complexity 
of human experience, and of demanding to 
anyone genuinely interested in bridging the gap 
between phenomenological accounts and other 
more objective ways of describing intentionality, 
to be aware of such complexity. 
Veronica Valle 
Faculty of Arts and Humanities 
University of Macau 
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The current state of personality assessment for 
clinical purposes is largely dominated by the ever-
present Big Five model, a taxonomy for personality 
traits based on language descriptors. This model is 
consistent with the Lexical hypothesis, which 
claims that the personality characteristics most 
important to people become, sooner or later, part 
of their language; furthermore, these traits are 
likely to be represented in language by a single 
word, as individuated in the five factors of this 
model: openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism. These 
were established using factor analysis in the 90s, 
making this model intrinsically theory-free. This 
top-down approach to the daunting task of 
classifying human personality traits, however all-
encompassing and noteworthy from certain 
perspectives, is flawed in the sense that it does not 
account for what biologically causes our 
personality. 
There is much that is still unknown about the 
complex workings of the brain, however, it is 
possible to ascertain that personality is largely 
determined by the fine tuning of certain systems 
 
Recensioni            371 
 
(or circuits), mostly involving anatomically 
ancient structures. To find these underlying 
mechanisms, classify and methodically investigate 
the influence they have on the behaviour of 
animals, has been one of Jaak Panksepp’s most 
important contributions to the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology. In essence, he gave 
birth to the field of Affective Neuroscience. 
Affective Neuroscience is the study of the 
subcortical affective BrainMind (the term Panksepp 
used to underline the assumption of monism). One 
of Panksepp’s main works, The Archaeology of Mind: 
Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions, 
offers an evidence-based taxonomy of the seven 
primary emotional systems that explain why and 
how we behave the way we do. These systems have 
been found to be common across all mammalian 
species and constitute effective evolutionary 
solutions for successful animal life on earth. The 
seven circuits (and corresponding behaviours) 
Panksepp identified in his research are: SEEKING 
(exploration, motivation), RAGE (anger), FEAR 
(anxiety), PANIC (sadness), PLAY (joy), CARE 
(nurturance), LUST (sexual arousal). 
In fact, since the primary emotions that are 
generated in those systems have intrinsically 
pleasant or unpleasant affects, they have a 
learning-facilitating function that is basically a 
“birthright survival system” for all mammals. This 
has already been thoroughly demonstrated by 
Panksepp (see J. PANKSEPP, L. BIVEN, The 
Archaeology of Mind, W.W. Norton Company, 
2012) using a variety of methods. For example, he 
showed that the artificial stimulation of some of 
those systems can be used as reward/punishment 
in a behavioural task with high effectiveness. The 
system of PLAY for instance, when activated, 
produces an internal state so pleasing that the 
animal actively seeks it; connecting the pressing 
of a lever (or whatever action needs to be trained) 
with the stimulation of this system leads to the 
reinforcement of that behaviour. Since the way 
we react to external stimuli, both in terms of our 
explicit behaviours and our internal states, can be 
considered to constitute our personality, these 
subcortical systems are the causal mechanisms 
that give rise to personality. Hence their 
importance in Panksepp’s work. 
The theory of personality built on the principles 
of affective neuroscience proposes the existence of 
endophenotypes, which are primary emotional-
affective personality profiles generated initially from 
our individual genomes; LUST has been inexplicably 
excluded from the systems that define our 
personality. Items in questionnaires such as the Big 
Five Questionnaire (BFQ) do not tap directly into 
the primary emotions that define endophenotypes, 
hence cannot be used to measure them. However, 
the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scale (ANPS) 
was specifically built to test Panksepp’s hypothesis 
that such endophenotypes exist. Its items are very 
explicit in asking about primary emotions so that 
only a minimum degree of cognitive processing is 
required to answer. Of course, ANPS is only a 
language-based report. More direct data will be 
needed to support Panksepp’s view, which, given the 
present level of technology, is still difficult to obtain. 
The ANPS is composed of 112 items arranged in 
fourteen blocks that include one question for each 
system plus one related to Spirituality and a filler 
research question; the complete version can be 
found in the appendix of the book. 
One of the main problems identified in 
clinical applications of the BFQ is the genericity 
of the factor Emotional Stability, which lumps 
together an array of negative affects, that 
correspond to activity in the FEAR, RAGE and 
PANIC emotional systems. Considering that the 
extremes of each of these emotions lead to 
different psychopathologies, it is important that 
the tests we use can distinguish between them. A 
person might have considerable issues in 
controlling anger but not suffer from depressive 
feelings and/or anxiety. Yet, this simple example 
would result in a medium to high score in the 
Emotional Stability factor, which does not give 
the clinician any insight whatsoever into the 
specificity of the patient’s sufferings. The 
Affective Neuroscience Personality Scale, instead, 
classifies symptoms on the basis of the 
dysregulated emotional system that brought them 
about. For this reason, the resulting scales are 
more useful for diagnostic purposes than the 
Emotional Stability factor in the BFQ. 
Considering the shortcomings of the Big Five 
model and the fact that Panksepp does not rely on 
it but developed the ANPS as an alternative scale 
to measure personality, it is perhaps strange that 
such a large portion of the book is dedicated to it. 
However, the attention he devotes to the Big Five 
is justified by the deeply-rooted position this 
model holds in the field of personality psychology 
worldwide; to challenge such a pillar of the field 
requires extensive discussion of its merits and 
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flaws, otherwise the author’s proposal for a new 
system would lack legitimacy. 
As Panksepp underlines in the chapter on 
Epigenetics and Psychopharmacology, the new 
model for personality has had an enthusiastic 
reception as well as many successful applications. 
Biotechnological studies have shown that 
personality traits acquired through epigenetic 
mechanisms are among the characteristics which 
can be inherited. Spending quality emotional time 
with parents can, thanks to epigenetics, promote 
the development of these emotional systems in 
such a way that reduces the incidence of problems 
like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and the necessity for pharmaceutical 
treatment later on. The same principle applies at 
a cultural level: in play-promoting environments, 
the PLAY system is more stimulated and becomes 
stronger, providing a protective factor against the 
development of personality related disorders. 
This feature is also inheritable due to epigenetic 
mechanisms. 
In the field of neuropsychopharmacology, the 
research conducted on the mammalian BrainMind 
on the basis of Panksepp’s model has led to the 
development of three new antide-pressant treat-
ments: the molecule GLYX-13 for the treatment of 
depressive symptoms has already passed toxicology 
tests and is having significant effects; deep-brain 
stimulation (DBS) of the SEEKING system is 
effective in counteracting major depression 
symptomatology, up to the point of eventually 
reversing it; and the opioid buprenorphine has 
been shown to be highly effective for the treatment 
of suicidal thoughts deriving from hyperactivity of 
the PAIN/Sadness system. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Emotional Foundations of Personality can be 
considered a textbook, both in terms of its content 
and structure. The background topics, especially 
Affective Neuroscience and the history of 
personality studies, are discussed in the beginning of 
the book, providing the necessary foundation for the 
more technical chapters at the end, which present 
neuroimaging studies and evidence from the field of 
neuropsychopharmacology. The book is structured 
in a way that allows the reader to peruse any chapter 
independently of the others. On the one hand, this is 
positive as the reader can focus only on the sections 
they are particularly interested in; on the other hand, 
the price paid for the independence of the chapters 
is a certain repetitiveness: the most crucial 
information is examined time and again throughout 
the book, excessively prolonging the reading 
experience, which, at times, can also feel a little 
fragmented. 
In spite of this, Panksepp’s work is certainly 
worth reading. This insightful book not only puts 
forward a fascinating new approach to personality 
theory but also provides a thorough account of all 
the steps taken to make it useful also for clinical 
purposes. At various points throughout the 
discussion, the author states that further research is 
needed to develop the field of Affective Neurosciences 
and to improve its clinical applications; still, plenty 
has already been done. To all interested in knowing 
more about the subject, Panksepp’s book and the 
twenty-eight pages of references included in it are 
undoubtedly a very good starting point. 
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